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Abstract 
 
Documents published in the latest volume of DBPO reveal interesting shifts in British views 
on Finland’s odds of survival in the changing post-war geopolitical situation. In 1944–45, the 
British government put the maintenance of the wartime alliance with the Soviet Union first 
and identified its interests in Finland, considered to lie in the Soviet security sphere, very 
narrowly. However, after this initial period of marked pessimism over Finland’s fate, the 
Foreign Office identified factors and trends which indicated that the Finns could carve a 
distinct position for themselves in the no-man’s land between the emerging Cold War blocs. 
By 1948, careful, yet guarded, optimism of Finland as a Nordic country capable of retaining 
its sovereignty and Western connections superseded an earlier view of Finland as an East 
European country, bound to fall under complete Soviet domination sooner or later.  
As Finland’s position improved, so Britain’s interests gradually widened. Were Finland now 
to fall under Soviet domination, the UK and the West had more to lose. In the absence of 
means to match Soviet influence in Finnish foreign policy and domestic affairs, British policy 
was defined in terms of applying ‘soft power’ to preserve Western interests: cultural and 
economic relations, propaganda and information campaigns, and the cultivation of personal 
contacts with leading Finns. Subsequently, pessimism and optimism oscillated in British 
analyses of the situation in Finland and assessments of how well this soft power worked, or 
what means of influence were available. At the same time, a determined effort was made to 
contain the expansion of Soviet influence in Northern Europe to Finland. 
 
Eden’s August 1944 Policy 
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In a seminal work on Finland in international politics in the post-war years, the Finnish 
historian Tuomo Polvinen began his account with a memorandum prepared for the War 
Cabinet by Sir Anthony Eden, the British foreign secretary on 9 August 1944.2 Eden first 
discussed at length the challenges posed by the Soviet Union in Europe. After dealing with 
the weightier and thornier issues, Eden briefly considered how the underlying geopolitical 
shifts influenced British standing and interests in Northern Europe. 
Referring to likely developments in Soviet post-war foreign policy, Eden assumed that it 
‘might seek cooperation with the Western powers ’ to cope with the ‘monumental task of 
reconstruction’. As long as the German threat was and remained neutralised, it would be 
unlikely that ‘the Soviet Union might try to take advantage of its military gains during the 
war by continuing to expand and by trying, with the aid of the extreme left, to provoke an 
open conflict with the forces of imperialism.’ Therefore, if ‘the Soviet Union showed a desire 
to respect Britain’s vital strategic interests, His Majesty’s Government had no cause to 
oppose the wishes of the Soviet government provided they were reasonable and did not 
conflict with British interests ’.3  
Turning to Scandinavia, and with the exit of Finland from the war in sight, Eden ‘could not 
foresee any incompatibility between British and Soviet interests’. Moscow would 
undoubtedly support left-wing parties throughout the region, but this was not particularly 
worrisome, since the parties of the extreme left were weak in Scandinavia. Eden s aw no 
signs of ‘any Soviet designs for territorial expansion in this area; on the contrary, Stalin had 
offered bases in Denmark and Norway to Britain in the Moscow talks in December 1941’.4 
Finland on the other hand was firmly and, as it seemed, irreversibly under Soviet military 
and political influence. Reminding the Cabinet how Stalin had asserted his rights during the 
Anglo-Soviet talks in 1941, Eden wrote that the ‘Russians claimed Finland as within their 
security sphere’. The Soviets insisted on the restoration of the frontier settled in the 
Moscow peace of 1940, the ceding of Petsamo facing the Arctic Sea in the high north, and 
‘some kind of military alliance which would give the Russians the right to maintain naval and 
military bases on Finnish territory’.5  
‘We have agreed to these terms’, Eden stated bluntly. In an often quoted paragraph he 
elaborated further British policy towards Finland: ‘Although we shall no doubt hope that 
Finland will be left some real degree of at least cultural and commercial independence and a 
parliamentary regime, Russian influence will in any event be predominant in Finland and we 
shall not be able, nor would it serve any important British interests, to contest that 
influence.’6 
There, therefore, British policy lay, and little could or should be done to change it. A dividing 
line between Soviet and British spheres of influence went along Finland’s western borders 
with Sweden and Norway. The three Scandinavian countries belonged to the British sphere. 
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Finland, together with the three small Baltic Republics that had already been written off 
earlier, was in the Soviet one. 
Many historians have found Eden’s August 1944 memorandum illuminating and a succinct 
expression of the new geopolitical realities which the outcome of the Second World War, 
especially the Soviet Union’s victory over Germany in the east, left in its wake. Eden’s views 
are widely held, and not only by Tuomo Polvinen, to have formed the bare facts upon which 
British policy towards Finland rested throughout the post-war period, and beyond.7 ‘It is 
fortunate for the historian’, the British historian Anthony Upton later wrote, ‘and saves 
much labour, that the British government had settled on a policy towards Finland in August 
1944, adhered to it constantly thereafter, and was honest enough to tell the Finnish 
government what it was, so that they could adapt to it’.8 Finland was in the Soviet sphere 
militarily and politically, and His Majesty’s Government had no intention or the means to 
challenge this state of affairs. 
If we take our cue from Upton’s thesis, and have Eden’s memorandum as our starting point, 
the history of Anglo-Finnish relations in the Cold War would not then be much more than 
mere footnotes to what was settled in August 1944. It is therefore interesting to find out – 
from reading the documents published in this handsome volume of Documents on British 
Policy Overseas (DBPO) – how far and for how long subsequent policy-makers actually 
followed Eden’s recommendations. And if changes in the basic assessment of the facts on 
the ground in Finland took place, what these were, and if they led the British to review their 
policy, what this then became. 
 
 
Finland in Eastern Europe 
 
When reading Eden’s words from August 1944, two qualifications must be made at the 
outset. The first is that the policy recommendations were based on a rather optimistic 
assumption that the wartime Anglo-Soviet alliance would continue in some form of 
understanding after the defeat of Germany. The other reservation concerns the way in 
which Soviet geopolitical and ideological aims were construed. Eden’s rather 
straightforward reading of Soviet aims as primarily defensive, and that the Soviet Union 
would not seek further expansion from where the war against Hitler took it, were by the 
summer of 1944 hardly representative of British expert opinion in its entirety, and even on 
Eden’s behalf probably reflected more war-weary hopefulness than verisimilitude. 
As was shown within the next one and half years, the first assumption proved false, and a 
Cold War followed between the wartime allies. Indeed, first signs of serious trouble among 
the Big Three became visible between the British and the Soviets in 1945–46, and only 
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somewhat later between the United States and the Soviet Union. The foundations of the 
second premise – of the limited nature of Soviet intentions – dissipated as well, as more 
deeply seated suspicions of Russian expansionism resurfaced at the war’s end.  
The third consideration, which may escape our attention, is that Eden was outlining policy 
towards a country with which the British were still at war. The United Kingdom had declared 
war on Finland in December 1941 and was therefore involved in the armistice talks and in 
drafting the final Paris peace treaty of 1947. A war between modern parliamentary 
democracies was perhaps only one of the oddities of the world war, but strange or not, it 
none the less defined most of the political agenda in Anglo-Finnish relations when the war 
came to a close in 1944–45.9 
At first, however, the foundations of the August 1944 policy held good, and His Majesty’s 
Government followed developments in Finland conditioned by this approach. How deeply 
ingrained the view of Finland as just another East European country within the Soviet sphere 
was, could be seen in Eden’s memorandum to the War Cabinet on 24 September 1944, 
where he reported on the Finnish armistice terms agreed in Moscow.10  
While the Finns were dismayed by the severity of the terms imposed on them, including as 
they did large scale territorial losses, massive reparations, rapid demobilisation of Finnish 
forces while effectively opening a new front in the north with conscripts to fight the 
seasoned Germans, a Soviet military and a naval base at the doorstep of the country’s 
capital Helsinki, requirements for domestic political changes and the entry of a Soviet-led 
Allied Control Commission (ACC) into the country to supervise the execution of the armistice 
terms, Eden’s view was quite different. ‘The main terms are, in most respects, those which 
were published and generally hailed as moderate when they were rejected by the Finns at 
an earlier stage’, Eden informed the Cabinet. ‘Although they are not light’, the terms did not 
mean that Finland would ‘cease to exist as an independent nation’, Eden continued.11 
The final peace treaty remained to be concluded later, but Eden was pleased to see that ‘the 
full extent of Russia’s main demands on Finland are [sic] now fixed and known. This is, I 
consider, all to the good’. The British had also played their part in making the terms more 
bearable to the Finns, as they had insisted that the reparations burden should not be 
insuperable for Finland to cope with, and most importantly, prevent them from contributing 
to the British reconstruction effort with their timber resources. Nor was the new Soviet 
military base next to Helsinki something to be so depressed about, as the head of the 
Swedish Foreign Office appeared to be. ‘Helsinki would be just as much under a permanent 
threat from Russian bombers were there no base at Porkkala-Ud’, Eden wrote. This 
indicated that the foreign secretary was, together with the Chiefs of Staff, apparently 
unaware how indefensible the base made the whole of southern Finland and the capital 
area. Besides being a base for operations on land and sea, it brought the capital within the 
range of the Red Army’s heavy artillery – something it had never managed to achieve by 
force during the war.12  
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The Finnish leaders saw things differently. ‘We are in the hands of the Russians’, the newly 
elected Finnish president, Field-Marshal Carl Mannerheim told his close confidant, Prime 
Minister Juho Kusti Paasikivi, who would succeed him as president of the republic in 1946. 
‘The agreement does not speak about capitulation, but in reality the armistice is 
capitulation. We cannot defend ourselves’, the dispirited and discouraged Field-Marshal, 
whose army had not been defeated in the battlefield, poured out his pessimism.13 
As it appeared, and what the British mostly sought after, was not Finland’s survival as such, 
but regional stability; a new status quo in Scandinavia and the Baltic area that both they and 
the Soviet Union could agree upon and respect. As is well known, the British were at the 
same time seeking an understanding of their respective spheres of influence in the 
Danubian and Balkan countries in the infamous ‘percentages agreement’, tabled by Prime 
Minister Winston Churchill in Moscow in October 1944. Eden’s views on Finland and the 
Scandinavian countries were not too distant echoes of this type of understanding brewing in 
Anglo-Soviet relations in general, only that in the north not only were there no percentages, 
but no explicit understanding either.  
In the absence of agreements, or percentages, what decided the matter were the facts on 
the ground and the respective parties’ behaviour. The passive stance adopted by the British 
both in the armistice talks in Moscow and subsequently in the Allied Control Commission in 
Helsinki, effectively communicated the British hope – both to the Soviets and to the Finns – 
that neither Finland nor the Northern region as a whole should become another ‘Balkan 
question’, nor pose such difficulties as, for example, the future of Poland did among the 
wartime allies. 
The reading of Eden’s memoranda from autumn 1944 and the reports from Helsinki by 
Francis Shepherd, the British political representative, indeed confirm the views expressed in 
standard historical accounts of how the August 1944 policy was carried out in Finland when 
peace came.14 Shepherd’s meeting in February 1945 with Colonel-General Andrei Zhdanov, 
the Control Commission’s notorious chairman, showed certain reserve on both sides, but 
views on delicate topics were generally exchanged in a friendly manner, and the discussion 
also made clear how the British mission in Helsinki respected the Soviet’s leading role and 
had no intention of challenging it.  
The main task was to steer Finland away from its previous alignment with Germany, 
militarism and anti-Soviet sentiments. However, the Finns were not necessarily quick 
learners. ‘We agreed about the slowness of the Finns in any kind of action, their absorption 
in themselves and their ignorance of affairs outside their own country’, Shepherd reported. 
So, the Allies had to work closely together to make progress. ‘We were cooperating 
satisfactorily’, Shepherd told Zhdanov, ‘but it would be a good thing for an occasional 
demonstration of solidarity to be brought home to the Finns’.15 
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Towards the end of their talk, Shepherd also raised the issue of British journalists’  visits to 
Finland to observe the forthcoming parliamentary elections. Given that Finland’s elections  
were the first democratic elections to be held in post-war Europe, their integrity was of 
obvious interest to the British, as well as the fact the Finnish communists were expected to 
make large gains in them. Here Shepherd quickly found out where Soviet sensitivities were.  
Without directly touching the elections themselves, Shepherd mentioned how British 
journalists would be interested to travel to Finland alongside their Swedish colleagues ‘for a 
day or two’ during the elections, and that he ‘would try to let the commission know if and 
when journalists did come’. That this was a sensitive subject for the Soviets was made clear 
to Shepherd, who reported how while he ‘was introducing the subject I noticed that M. 
Orlov [Zhdanov’s deputy] was beating a loud tattoo with his fingers on the back of his sofa, 
evidently with intention of warning me off it.’ Shepherd, however, continued with it, and 
informed the ‘somewhat embarrassed’ Colonel-General of the forthcoming journalists’ 
visits, who raised no objection to the matter. However, this was as far as Shepherd was 
willing to test the cooperative spirit of the allies. 16 
 
 
The Soviet Defensive Sphere in the North 
 
In the parliamentary elections of March 1945 the Finnish communists indeed made gains 
and formed a new government together with social democrats and centrist-agrarian forces. 
According to the prevailing view in London of Finland as an East European country, this was 
probably to be expected, and merely strengthened the image of Finland lying firmly within 
the Soviet sphere. Despite the intense interest in the outcome of the elections, more 
important was the resumption of normal trading contacts in the spring of 1945, after which 
Finland retook its position as one of Britain’s principal suppliers of timber and related 
products.17 
The basic view of Finland changed little until the following summer. In a dispatch from 
Helsinki on 24 July 1945, Francis Shepherd elaborated the mutually beneficial nature of the 
resumed trade relations between Finland and Britain, but reminded London that in spite of 
these contacts in the economic sphere, Finland was ‘definitely in the Russian defensive 
sphere’. ‘There is presumably no doubt that we shall do our utmost to retain and improve 
our interests in the other Scandinavian countries, but Finland is in an intermediate position’, 
Shepherd wrote. It was a ‘matter for consideration, whether, after a certain point, British 
interests in Finland would not invoke counter-measures by Soviet Russia which might not 
only nullify our own efforts but might even have the opposite effect’. 18 
7 
 
With the war in Europe over, the question of the final peace settlement became acute. In 
that connexion the British had their eyes set on the future of Finland’s military forces. The 
view, that it was to be expected, that the Finnish army was being ‘recast on the Russian 
model’, and rearmed with Soviet weapons, was shared by the Helsinki mission and officials 
in London alike.19 Although the recasting did not eventually go quite as far as this, British 
arms exporters subsequently found Soviet competition to be tough on several occasions 
during the Cold War. In 1945 what was most important, however, was what the prospect of 
maintaining a Finnish military capability meant in the worsening political climate between 
Britain and the Soviet Union. 
In the summer of 1945 rumours circulated that a Soviet-Finnish military pact was in the 
making. Even if it was difficult to ascertain how quickly this would materialise and how 
serious the reported preliminary talks and speculations were, the British gave the 
information serious thought and followed the issue closely.20 According to the still prevailing 
‘August 1944’ view of Finland in the Foreign Office, it was concluded in July 1945 that a 
‘Soviet-Finnish treaty of alliance would be unlikely to do more than confirm the actual  state 
of affairs’.21 However, the reasoning that followed this assessment provided an indication 
that in London policy-makers were having second thoughts of writing Finland off more or 
less completely. 
As Finland had practically no relevance in the military-strategic calculations of the Chiefs of 
Staff at this point, the question of an alliance between it and the Soviet Union had little 
intrinsic value. That, however, did not mean that the issue was irrelevant. A concern 
expressed in the summer 1945, which would also be typical in British Cold War views of 
Finland, was related to the effects which Soviet policy in Finland would have elsewhere in 
the region, especially in Scandinavia, but also perhaps even more widely in Europe. While 
the prospect of a Soviet-Finnish military alliance was discussed, it was pointed out how a 
Soviet treaty with Finland together with Roumania, Bulgaria and Hungary ‘would have most 
depressing effect on the limitrophe Allied countries, such as Norway and Greece, who would 
be alarmed at the strength of the new combination of alliances with Soviet Russia as the 
centre piece’.22 
The first step towards revising the basic British policy towards Finland was then the 
acknowledgment that perhaps Britain should not just remain a bystander as the Soviets 
consolidated their interests in Finland. ‘The disadvantages of aligning Europe into two 
camps are obvious’, a briefing paper prepared at the FO noted in July. ‘But if the Soviet 
Government proceed with their plans, there would be even greater disadvantage in our 
merely watching without doing anything to put heart into our friends who live on the border 
of this Russian system of alliances ’.23 
The question remained how to meet the Soviet challenge, which was another concern that 
would be revisited time after time. In the summer of 1945, the way the world was being 
then reorganised, appeared to present one possible answer. As was contemplated in the FO 
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briefing paper, Finland’s participation in the newly created ‘World Organisation’ might 
provide one way to counter the trend. As it was suggested in the Foreign Office, Finland’s 
admission  to the United Nations Organisation, which, after concluding an alliance with the 
Finns, the Soviets would be ‘in a weak position to oppose’, might bring it ‘a little out of the 
Russian orbit and into the wider of community of nations’.24 
As a practical policy, Finland’s UN membership was not a strong position to achieve much, 
but the significance was not in the answer provided, but in the question that was asked: 
how to pull Finland ‘a little out’ of the Russian orbit? The first winds of the Cold War had 
started to blow, and would soon lead the British to modify their August 1944 policy towards 
Finland and develop a Cold War strategy to meet the Soviet challenge there and in the 
region. In the first phase, however, the visible increase of Soviet influence in the vicinity of 
its western borders, led to mixed responses. 
Besides the prospect of a military alliance between Finland and the Soviet Union, a key issue 
in 1945 and much of 1946 was the question of Finland’s future military potential. It was 
restricted by a range of stipulations in the final Paris peace treaty that came into force in 
1947. As is shown with ample evidence by the historians Tuomo Polvinen and Pekka Visuri, 
it was indeed the expectation that Finnish military power would only contribute to Soviet 
aggregate military strength in a future conflict that led the British to insist on the rather 
strict limitations put on Finnish military forces as to their numbers and weaponry in the 
Paris peace treaty. 
That the restrictions originated from London and not from Moscow, was one of the rather 
less well received surprises the Finns learned in the 1970s, when historians began to be able 
to access the relevant files in the Public Record Office. As it happened, Finland was lumped 
together with Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary, all of whose military forces were limited by 
the peace treaty as a result of Britain’s demands.25 In this respect, Cold War considerations 
in Britain’s policy towards Finland led first into a negative policy aimed at minimizing 
Finland’s military usefulness to the Soviet Union rather than maximising its ability to 
withstand Soviet political, economic and military pressure – the latter of which would have 
been obviously easier and credible had the country been able to arm itself with modern 
weapons. 
 
 
Cold War Views Crystallise 
 
As Anglo-Soviet relations became gradually more strained in the course of 1945, Britain’s 
policy towards Finland was revised. New nuances emerged also in the British assessment of 
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the situation in Finland. These changes were reflected in how the new developments were 
received in London.  
As an undercurrent of the negative British Cold War policy line towards Finland however, 
there was, from the beginning, a positive one as well. In time, it overtook the negative 
policy, although the negative one did not vanish altogether. First, however, hard questions 
had to be asked on the state of Anglo-Soviet relations as a whole. 
At first, it seemed that Anglo-Soviet cooperation worked rather well in the Allied Control 
Commission (ACC) in Helsinki, in particular in comparison with other similar arrangements in 
Germany’s ex-satellite countries. However, diverse practical difficulties and tensions with 
the Soviet element in the ACC in Finland, and in particular changes the Soviets had made in 
the Finnish armistice agreement after hostilities had ended in Europe in May, led the British 
military representatives to ponder how long they should continue the policy ‘appeasement’ 
towards their Soviet counterparts, which they continued ‘in the absence of guidance’ from 
the Foreign Office.26 
This pondering without guidance did not last long. From the summer 1945 onwards, and 
definitely by late 1945 - early 1946 we can see that all the key elements of a new British 
policy towards Finland have taken shape. By 1948 this rethinking had moulded into an 
approach which, with some modifications, formed the basis of Britain’s Cold War policy 
towards Finland and the Nordic region; what British interests were, how to maintain them 
and to contain Soviet influence, and by and large handle Finland’s relations with the West. 
The critical turn in British views on Finland can be seen in a number of documents from 
November 1945 to February 1946, some of which are also now available now in this DBPO 
volume. On 24 November 1945 Shepherd despatched a lengthy report by Colonel James 
Magill, a member of the British element of the ACC, with a covering letter to Foreign 
Secretary Ernst Bevin that proved pivotal in determining what line the British should take in 
the region given the worsening relations with the Soviet Union. 
In his report of 30 October 1945, Magill suggested that a more coordinated British policy 
should be developed for Finland and Scandinavia. Magill, in somewhat alarmist terms, saw 
the Soviet Union developing a potentially dangerous platform for its ‘complete domination 
of the whole of Scandinavia. He advised that Britain should try to prevent this, 'since in time 
of peace this would interfere with our trade and in time of war would mean that parts of 
Scandinavia could be used as a base for operations against Great Britain and her sea 
communications'.27 
Scandinavia seemed to be a military vacuum, which in a time of crisis would be filled from the 
east. Britain should offer assistance to the Scandinavian countries and help them to gain 
confidence and develop closer Scandinavian cooperation. Britain should let the Scandinavians 
know that it did not intend to let them to 'slide unresisting into the jaws of Russia', as Magill 
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phrased it. Britain needed to coordinate its policies towards Scandinavia in general and 
towards Sweden, 'the key to the problem', in particular.28 
Magill’s reading of Soviet intentions in northern Europe diverged from views that were still 
considered as established notions in London, and which also had formed the second premise 
of Eden’s August 1944 memorandum, namely that Stalin’s aims were limited. Echoing views 
that had rapidly gained ground among British military experts and planners from 1944 
onwards, Magill took it practically for granted that the Soviet Union was also expanding its 
sphere of influence in the north. However, Foreign Office officials were not at all convinced 
that there was much evidence to prove that this was the case. In the Northern Department the 
general feeling in November 1945 was still, that this conclusion was 'premature, to say the 
least of it'.29 The Foreign Office needed more factual details and evidence about Soviet 
intentions, before a coordinated containment policy could be formulated for Scandinavia.  
Although the evidence of Soviet expansionism was slender, Magill’s views were supported by 
Shepherd in his covering dispatch to Bevin, as well as by Thomas Brimelow, the Russian desk 
officer in the Northern Department, who thought Magill's views 'a pretty fair summary of the 
admittedly limited and inconclusive evidence available'.30 ‘While Russian military domination 
of Finland is inevitable’, Shepherd thought, ‘there are I think good grounds for resisting so far 
as possible too strong a domination in other respects’. ‘It would be to our advantage 
therefore, even from the strategic point of view, to encourage not only Finnish independence 
but also the western form of democracy in Finland, Finnish cultural relations with Scandinavia 
and Western Europe, and Finnish affinity with Scandinavia in general. For these reasons, I 
believe that Finland should be treated as part of Scandinavia on all planes other than the 
military plane’, Shepherd wrote.31 
It did not take long for the ideas of Finland’s closer attachment with the free standing and 
independent minded Scandinavians to find broader resonance and become an established 
view in London. In a couple of months time the views held at first by British representatives in 
Helsinki and in the ACC became a new orthodoxy, which led to a revision of the August 1944 
policy. This happened, of course, as part and parcel of a bigger change in the British view of 
the post-war world. The general mood and thinking about Stalin's intentions was switching 
into a Cold War mode among British policy-makers at large, and soon thereafter by the wider 
public as well.32 The perception of hostile Soviet intentions on a wide front of issues and areas 
was particularly important to the way those policymakers who were most immediately 
responsible for Scandinavian affairs in the Foreign Office (Christopher Warner and his 
successor as Head of Northern Department, Robin Hankey) saw Scandinavia. The influence the 
Soviet Union might be able to exert beyond Finnish borders to Scandinavia, was a particular 
source of concern. 
‘We agree generally with your despatch’, Christopher Warner, a key official handling Soviet 
and Northern European affairs in the Foreign Office, wrote to Francis Shepherd on 26 February 
1946.33 As a part of a general trend and crystallization of a negative image of Soviet intentions, 
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a major shift in the Foreign Office’s thinking of the challenge posed by the Soviet Union in the 
north, had taken place. ‘I think that we should assume and encourage Finnish 
independence’, Warner wrote.34 But again, how to achieve this, was a problem. ‘[It] is 
perhaps rather a question of not discouraging Finnish affinity with the rest of Scandinavia 
rather than encouraging it’, Warner suggested as Britain’s low key approach in Finland. 
Anything the British might be able to do for Finland, could be easily offset if the Soviet 
Union was provoked to act in Finland.  
Also how the Finns would and could themselves handle their position in the emerging Cold 
War no-man’s land, was uncertain.  It was not clear whether they themselves were either 
too soft or not determined to withstand Soviet pressure or fight communism at home, an 
issue which was repeatedly raised in subsequent Cold War years.35 Or that they were too 
hard and determined, and only too eager to engage in anti-communist and anti-Soviet 
campaigning, which would only do harm to themselves and bring no benefit for others.36 As 
Warner observed,  ‘too rash a demonstration of independence from the Finns’ would ‘bring 
about their own punishment from the Russians’. However, anything ‘in the nature of a 
Scandinavian bloc or of overt Finnish participation, at the present time at least, in 
Scandinavian affairs, must be regarded as ruled out by fear of Russia ’.37 
Finland’s difficult position notwithstanding, an important distinction could be made in the 
winter of 1946 over how Finland had feared its post-war transition, compared to other 
countries facing the Soviet Union. According to Shepherd in Helsinki, the communists 
appeared to be losing rather than gaining ground in Finnish domestic politics. ‘Finland has 
got off lightly so far’, Warner wrote to Shepherd and advised caution in how to handle what 
had become ‘a delicate balance in Finland’: ‘This delicate situation could perhaps be easily 
upset for the worse if we seemed suddenly to have decided to play a stronger hand in 
Finland’.38 
The view of Finland as an East European country at the mercy of the Russians was 
transformed into a view of Finland as a Nordic country that could – at least in theory – be 
saved from complete Soviet domination. The perspective, where Finland’s position in the 
emerging Cold War order was defined as a part of the northern front rather than the East 
European sphere, opened a whole new panorama of possible ways to influence it and 
counter Soviet influence. How the British should play a hand which seemed to have 
somewhat improved in 1946, then became the issue that needed to be resolved. 
 
 
Britain’s Soft Power 
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During 1946 a fundamental change of view took place in London about how to deal with the 
Soviet Union, and what Britain and the Europeans needed from the United States. Not much 
remained of the wartime Anglo-Soviet alliance, but hopes were raised about a future one 
with Western European countries, ultimately involving the Americans. Soviet actions and 
behaviour were considered, by and large, to be hostile and expansionist. Even if one held a 
somewhat more understanding basic view of the Soviet leaders’ troubled quest for security, 
the mere presence of Soviet power seemed to contradict British interests wherever London 
policy-makers set their eyes.  
The overall picture, nonetheless, was not uniform. Especially in northern Europe, the nature 
of the ultimate goals the Soviet Union which may have had, were less clearly resolved by 
events as they unfolded in the post-war years than elsewhere in Europe.  This remains a 
subject which still today attracts a lively debate by historians. An important and useful point 
of departure for a discussion about from where and how to analyse Soviet intentions, and 
also to contain its power, was Finland. 
After the British Cold War views had crystallised, Finland served a double purpose. First, in 
the wider context of British Cold War policy, Finland was a ‘canary in the coal mine’ whose 
current health indicated how sulphurous the Soviet breathing in its immediate 
neighbourhood was. Related to this, was a need to contain the spread of Soviet influence in 
Finland and within its borders, especially in order to maintain Western standing and 
interests in Scandinavia. 
Secondly, there were concerns and considerations which had mostly local significance, and 
which had mainly to do with how the Cold War eventually was played out in Finland. Here 
Finland became an interesting test case of Britain’s newly discovered, or rediscovered, 
source of power in the post-war world.  
Having lost its relative economic and military might in the course of the first half of the 20 th 
century, and at the same time most of its political weight in world affairs, Britain still had 
different mechanisms for exerting influence, and forms of power at its disposal. Whereas 
with the Scandinavians the British goal became to pull them outright into the Western 
alliance system, where the core elements consisted of hard military security, with Finland 
Britain needed an alternative approach. The only feasible way to maintain British interests 
and fight the Cold War in Finland was to use other means.  
‘The way is open for us to encourage the Finns to proceed with the development of their 
own sturdy democracy and to avoid becoming tainted with the totalitarian methods which 
the Communists would like to introduce’, Shepherd wrote from Helsinki on 30 July 1946.39 
While encouraging the Finns, the British had to make sure, as Robin Hankey commented 
Shepherd’s letter, that the Finns were not led to believe that ‘we can help them if, by 
opposing Soviet wishes too obstinately, they get themselves into trouble’.40 
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Given the circumstances in the UK and in Finland, to apply British ‘soft power’, to borrow a 
scholarly phrase from an age yet to come, might actually deliver the desired objectives: 
influence Finland on the long run to the right direction, while not turning it in a wrong 
direction in the short term. In the absence of the kind of power and presence in Finland to 
match Soviet influence directly, the British should use whatever means they had available: 
cultural and economic relations, propaganda and information campaigns  – either carried 
out in the open or in the dark – the work of the British Council, BBC broadcasts, and the 
cultivation of personal contacts with leading Finns  and so forth.41 
The first consistent articulation of this approach can be found from February 1947, when 
Francis Shepherd, soon to leave for his next posting in the warmer climes of the Dutch East-
Indies, drafted a formulation of Britain’s basic policy towards Finland. According to 
Shepherd the British aims were to ‘encourage, and as far as possible secure, the continued 
political and economic independence of Finland; and for this purpose to encourage relations 
with the West in general and discourage undue subordination to the USSR.’ In addition to 
this the British should ‘encourage Fenno-British trade’, and to ‘reinstate friendly relations 
between the Finnish and British Governments and peoples by means of expanding cultural 
and business relations’.42  
What Shepherd put on paper then reappeared in almost identical words throughout the 
Cold War in numerous policy guideline documents. A key word in the phrasing was the word 
‘encourage’. Shepherd informed Foreign Secretary Bevin, that to carry out this policy the UK 
mission in Helsinki had adopted a method so as to ‘exert a maximum of influence with a 
minimum of display’.43 Not only was Britain’s power soft, it should not be too visible either. 
This was probably something that policy-makers and cabinet ministers grappling with 
Britain’s post-war austerity and the eventual imperial decline, could readily agree to.  
How all this would work in practice remained to be seen. After the first Cold War years, 
pessimism and optimism oscillated in British analyses of the situation in Finland, and how 
well the soft power approach worked, or what means of influence were available. Cultural 
diplomacy bore its fruits slowly, and often in intangible ways. In the economic and trade 
sphere, British self-interest often came first, and a much harder line on the Finns on trade 
policy was adopted than would have been preferred by officials responsible for the Finland 
desk at the FO.44  
At times, the situation on the ground alerted observers in London and led to a renewal of 
the kind of pessimism that lay behind the August 1944 views. In February 1948, after 
hearing the news of Stalin’s approach to Paasikivi and the forthcoming talks of a military 
pact, R. G. A. Etherington-Smith from the FO calmed down the Chiefs of Staff, who were 
certain ‘that it was only a matter of time before Finland fell completely under Russian 
domination like the other Russian satellites’.45 That this view was premature was proven by 
events, but in 1948 it required optimism, and vision, to hold on to the basic policy line. As  
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Bevin himself, with much foresight, explained to the cabinet in April 1948 the outcome of 
the Fenno-Soviet pact talks: 
‘[T]he firm attitude adopted by the Finnish Government resulted in the signature of a treaty 
which on the face of it preserved Finland from Soviet interference in her internal affairs and 
treated her rather as a neutral buffer state than a Soviet satellite. The Soviet government 
had not pressed for bases in Finland and, although in war the provisions of the treaty for 
prior consultation before Soviet troops entered Finland might be to little effect, Finland had 
at least been given a breathing space and in a few years’ time, when she had completed the 
payment of reparations to Russia, her natural trade interests were likely to strengthen her 
ties with Western Europe’.46 
 
Conclusion 
 
In August 1944 Anthony Eden founded Britain’s post-war European policy in the 
continuance of the Anglo-Soviet alliance, aimed at ‘preventing any recurrence of German 
aggression’. Within ‘this framework we might consolidate our position in the countries of 
Western Europe and Scandinavia, in Turkey, Greece, and eventually, Italy. We should avoid 
a direct challenge to Russian interests in central European countries adjacent to the Soviet 
Union, but we ought to avail ourselves of every opportunity to spread British influence in 
these countries.’47 
The challenge was how to reconcile the ends with the means. To maintain British standing 
and interests in the different corners of Europe – not to speak of the world at large – a 
rethinking of the nature of Britain’s power was essential. ‘In the nineteenth century our 
power in Europe was greatly enhanced by the fact that we had stood for political as well as 
industrial progress, and had been willing to use our influence in the support of popular 
democratic forces against autocracy’, Eden wrote. ‘In the post-war period our influence 
would depend largely on the extent to which the countries of Europe judged that our 
methods would be successful in dealing with their social and economic problems.’48 
Despite the fact that Eden’s recommendations on how to deal with the Soviet Union in 
Finland and in Scandinavia were subsequently modified, and a more forward and active 
stance adopted, we can see there the seeds of Britain’s Cold War ‘soft power’ approach. 
Soft power alone could hardly move Finland away from its geopolitical location. Soft power, 
nevertheless, could change ways of thinking, and how the world was, and is, constructed in 
the minds of people and policy-makers. Soft power wielded in and outside Finland, 
combined with how ‘their social and economic problems’ were resolved in Finnish domestic 
life, removed Finland in the late 1940s away from its East European predicament and 
confirmed its location in Europe as a Nordic country. As a Nordic country, with some skill 
15 
 
and good luck, it could solve its East European problems. As the Cold War came to a close in 
the 1980s, Finland saw its end as a Nordic country with Nordic problems. 
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